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ABSTRACT 
The authors explore the definition of a “prehistory of ideas”, and both its similarities 
and differences in comparison to the history of ideas. They propose the word-and-
concept, “ethics”, in prehistory, explain the timing of its evolution, and then take it 
into historical time in the Levant, using Biblical references. They propose that new 
findings from cognitive science, neuroscience, and genomics may allow the eventual 
crossing of the prehistory/history borderline in tracing a time sequence for ideas. 
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1. INTRODUCING A PREHISTORY OF IDEAS 
The term “prehistory of ideas” appears at first to be internally contradictory. 
Could there be a such a field? The history of ideas is a multi-disciplinary en-
deavor that traces human word-and-concepts through time based on the way 
words are used, especially in literature but also, at the edges, in other formal 
writing systems that appear to have true grammars, like Egyptian or Mayan 
hieroglyphics. Travelling back further in time, we find patterns of art, archi-
tecture, and villages. Even earlier, we find different types of encampments, 
as for early Homo sapiens and Homo neanderthalensis. Different species 
huddled around fires and travelled out from central campsites in different 
ways, some using Euclidean geometry and others, a star-shaped pattern 
(Wynn 2009). It is reasonable to conclude that these two species thought dif-
ferently and used various concepts that were voiced in different ways. How-
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ever, they left us no words. 
Before these species, we find tool patterns, used and reused according to 
what must be, our eyes and minds tell us, something like a set of rules. Ar-
rangements recur. The results point to different “styles.” We know that who-
ever fashioned these placements of nicks-out-of-rocks had something in 
mind. For Homo erectus, who evolved 1.9 million years ago, finely made 
stone hand axes leave evidence that some thing, surely a “word-and-
concept” as it is known in the history of ideas, existed in the minds of beings 
who were not yet quite as advanced as we are along the evolutionary lines of 
our genus Homo. These beings arranged their thoughts and projected those 
thoughts out onto the physical world using rules. 
While it appears clear that Homo erectus had concepts (we surmise from 
his patterned tools), we ask: Did the species have words and therefore word-
and-concepts? A consensus appears to be emerging in the literature that, 
from at least a mid-point of the evolution of Homo erectus, around one mil-
lion years ago when the species learned to control fire, our ancestors proba-
bly had the biology to produce grammatical language (cf. Aiello and Dunbar 
1993; Barnard 2008; cf. Gunz et al. 2019, 125). Was it fully grammatical, 
like ours, with infinitely recombinable phonemes and morphemes? Some say 
Yes, some say No. The point is that the “word-and-concept” very likely ex-
isted from around this point in human evolution. Our view is that it would 
have been very difficult for Homo erectus to leave Africa beginning one mil-
lion years ago and colonize the rest of the Old World all the way to East 
Asia, if the species had not had at least a rudimentary language – that, and 
the dog, partially domesticated, but indeed the dog (cf. Rappaport and Cor-
bally 2020, 90-91). The treks involved would have been too rigorous without 
these two companions: Language and the dog. 
Therefore, de minimis, the history of ideas is about arranging word-and-
concepts according to rules, through time. An enormous question is where 
those rules came from, and we address this question briefly, below, when we 
address the neuroscience of the concept of “ethics” – moral rules. Again, the 
bigger problem is that we have no words in the prehistory of ideas. Without 
words we cannot derive the same progressions through time. Or can we? Can 
we have a word-less prehistory of ideas? Or, can word-and-concepts be pro-
posed, codified, contexualized, and named according to circumstantial (but 
still scientifically derived) evidence like population density, sexual dimor-
phism, age profile, and economy? Can related evidence for words substitute 
for words? Perhaps. 
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1.1. THE ADVENT OF COGNITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY 
About a decade into the present millennium, pioneer archaeologist Thomas 
Wynn, at the University of Colorado, proposed an innovative approach to 
prehistoric cognition based on burgeoning new scientific fields: neurosci-
ence, cognitive science, and paleoneurology (the study of the neurological 
systems of extinct species). The initial premise was simple. Given what is 
known about the existing species of the genus Homo, i.e., Homo sapiens, can 
we take the evidence from newer sciences and project it back into earlier 
members of Homo, and draw some conclusions about how they thought – 
i.e., about their cognition? Until Coolidge and Wynn published his approach 
(2009), most archaeologists had concluded the study of prehistoric cognition 
was too risky. After all, we would never be able to test Homo erectus like we 
can test modern humans in the laboratory. We can never dissect the cadaver 
of an extinct species, and we can learn only so much from “endocasts” (cast 
models of brains made from skulls of extinct species, which show ridges, 
clefts, and major brain divisions). Furthermore, we will likely not have a 
time machine to take us back to observe extinct species. Therefore, many 
concluded that “there is no evidence for prehistoric cognition,” beyond lithic 
traditions. Some adventurously studied settlement patterns (Wadley et al. 
2011), but still, there were no words, just patterns. 
This argument could be used to challenge the proposed prehistory of ide-
as, but we contend that a prehistory of ideas is essentially a more multidisci-
plinary cognitive archaeology. They intersect, to good effect. They cross the 
history/prehistory boundary, which is an unnecessary artifact, using another 
(and not a complimentary) meaning of the word “artifact”. The best “prehis-
tory of ideas” would be anthropologists and historians working hand in hand. 
As it turned out, using logic, population data, modern cognitive science, 
three-dimensional re-creations of the expansion of earlier species’ brains 
based on data from living species and their skull forms, as well as the theory 
of population genetics and genomic studies of specific genes in humans and 
related species (Harris 2015; Bruner et al. 2018; Gunz et al. 2019), we have 
been able to conclude quite a lot about the prehistory of human cognition. 
The approach is highly multidisciplinary, cross-referencing results from 
many fields, and the best studies stand out for their reliance on many differ-
ent types of analysis. We review this approach in Rappaport and Corbally 
(2020), where we give examples of its utility in studying advanced neu-
rocognitive traits like reading, mathematics, moral capacity, and religious 
capacity. We also cross the history/prehistory boundary in Rappaport and 
Corbally (2018), in an examination of “compassion” as a form of decision 
making, including a word-and-concept sequence in Biblical texts. Finally, 
we take a strongly eclectic approach to network neuroscience by cross-
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referencing studies in biology, paleoneurology, ethnography, and neurosci-
ence in Rappaport and Corbally (2019). These studies are taking archaeology 
into new realms unimagined by specialists in “stones and bones” archaeolo-
gy. What we are finding is that, when those stones and bones are analyzed 
along with findings from the newer sciences, as well as the ethnology of liv-
ing hunter gatherers, and our growing knowledge of psychology and neuro-
science, a great deal about earlier species’ thought and behavior can be 
proposed. One of the latest compilations of studies in cognitive archaeology 
focuses primarily on lithic production and has been named, Squeezing Minds 
from Stones (Overmann and Coolidge 2019), which is an apt description. We 
prefer a multidisciplinary approach that squeezes meaning from data ac-
quired using multiple analytical techniques. Any “prehistory of ideas” would 
not be for the faint of heart or the one-track mind, and it would require keep-
ing up with multiple disciplines. 
It is important for our proposal of a prehistory of ideas to identify its sim-
ilarities and differences with the history of ideas in terms of methods for ana-
lyzing sequence or “path.” The history of ideas traces word-and-concepts 
through time, usually by historical period or through dated historical docu-
ments. On the other hand, the cognitive archaeologist reconstructs a se-
quence of decisions within an individual prehistoric being. For example, 
Wynn explains that careful analysis of a Homo erectus hand axe provides a 
“chaîne opératoire [that] documents a sequence of decisions actually made 
by a prehistoric actor… As a method, it has provided some of our most com-
prehensive pictures of prehistoric minds in action….” (Wynn 2009, 148). 
This notion of a cognitive sequence later becomes important in our prop-
osition that moral decision making may have arisen first in Homo erectus. 
We find that one of the salient features of the neurocognitive capacity of 
moral thinking is the use of a timeline and understanding consequences on a 
timeline, within a social group. We reason that if Homo erectus could work 
along a timeline in conceiving and structuring a hand axe, the species could 
well reason along a timeline with respect to the consequences of actions, 
both “good” and “bad”. All these mental operations appear simple to us – we 
use them every day – but they are beyond the reach of any other Primate 
species other than Homo erectus and Homo sapiens, and probably Homo ne-
anderthalensis and other early hominid species with whom early Homo sa-
piens crossbred. Genomic analyses confirm archaeological findings on one, 
the Denisovans (Meyer et al. 2012), but deep data mining of the human ge-
nome also points to one, maybe two others. 
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2. ETHICS: A WORD-AND-CONCEPT IN THE PREHISTORY OF IDEAS 
Word-and-concepts in the history of ideas can be defined in taxonomies at 
many levels of inclusivity, from the very general to the extremely precise. 
However, working in the prehistory of ideas does not often allow a high lev-
el of specificity, except sometimes with stone tools, dentition, and bones. We 
see good specificity in cognition, for example, in psychologist Coolidge and 
archaeologist Wynn’s interpretation of Neanderthal forays out from camp in 
a “star-shaped pattern” and early Homo sapiens forays according to a more 
“Euclidean” understanding of the landscape (Coolidge and Wynn 2009, 195; 
cf. Gamble 1999). There is indeed a fundamental cognitive difference in the 
two approaches, and our early Homo sapiens ancestors must have realized a 
difference in how the two species behaved when they met prehistorically in 
Eurasia. Our neuroscience and cognitive science tell us that the navigation 
capacity is seated in the parietal lobes. However, did our ancestors have a 
word-and-concept for this difference in navigation? Probably, but it is lost to 
prehistory and we are now left to name it what we will. 
In this short paper, we address a word-and-concept that is of more interest 
to most readers in the history of ideas than stone tools, dentition, bones, or 
even navigation. We investigate “ethics” or moral rules, which is a concept 
that is very basic to all human cultures. All humans develop in groups that 
define “good” from “bad” according to a set of rules. The origin of these 
rules is the subject of substantial debate. To date, most cultural anthropolo-
gists have interpreted moral rule making as an entirely cultural process. Re-
cently, with the introduction of the notion of “cultural neural reuse” and its 
tendency to establish human neurocognitive traits that use the same neuro-
logical networks and organs, from group to group, some of us are beginning 
to suspect that rules are not quite as arbitrary as decades of cultural anthro-
pology have maintained (Christiansen and Müller 2014; Anderson 2010). 
There may be favored neurological pathways, but network neuroscience is 
now in its infancy, so proof of this emerging thesis must await good data in 
the future. 
Our working definition of “ethics” for modern humans of the species 
Homo sapiens conforms both to the facts of cultural variation that have been 
well documented ethnographically, and whatever lessons may emerge from 
the future results of network neuroscience. We define ethics as derivative of 
“religious thinking,” which stabilized 150,000-120,000 years ago with the 
globularization of the human skull in response to expansion of specific brain 
organs (Rappaport and Corbally 2020, 167). The capacity for religious think-
ing gives rise to “religious behavior” in all its variety worldwide and through 
time. 
We define “theological creativity” as a component of religious thinking, 
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which allows moral rules (“ethics”) to be fashioned from desirable qualities 
of supernatural beings. Our institutional role for religion defines its purpose 
as supporting the social group, whatever that social group is. Theological 
creativity, as a neurological capacity, allows humans to accommodate the 
opposing forces of the stability and social support of religion, with social and 
environmental change, including unusual one-time events like the explosion 
of volcanoes, floods, and epidemics. What is interesting is the fact that moral 
rules, or ethics, can change. If modern humans did not have a creative com-
ponent in their religious thinking, it could not continue to serve them, mil-
lennium after millennium. Religious thinking would become useless. 
However, we can see in the history of ideas that ethics can and do change. 
This is a capacity that is organically based, and so, a response to evolution-
ary innovations that hopefully can be traced eventually through the genomes 
recaptured from humans and others on the line to modern humans. The neu-
rological components and operation of the components in religious thinking 
should be reflected in the genomes of beings on the way to being fully hu-
man, and modern humans, as well. Analysis of human and closely related 
species like Neanderthals allows us now to estimate when specific genes ap-
peared in prehistory. Our own genome consists of a history of genes and 
when they appeared (cf. Harris 2015), and therefore, by extension, when the 
cognitive capacities related to the genes were enabled. 
Ethics are cultural rules for preferred behavior, according to a continuum 
from “good” to “bad.” We contend that moral rules, or ethics, first emerged 
in Homo erectus, according to our Human Hearth Hypothesis, rather than 
later in Homo sapiens (Rappaport and Corbally 2016a). The supernatural be-
ings who populate all our species’ many cosmologies and often teach us 
“right” from “wrong” were likely not present for Homo erectus. Still, it is 
possible that the first glimmers of beliefs in spirits emerged around a com-
mon hearth for groups of Homo erectus that ranged up to 100-110 individu-
als (Aiello and Dunbar 1993, 188). It was in that intense experiential context 
that we propose the word-and-concept referring to “moral rules” or “ethics” 
first came into being. The genome of Homo erectus has not yet been re-
trieved, but we feel sure that it will be, eventually. When it is, the appear-
ance of some of the neurological features of moral discernment should be 
identifiable. 
We present a full model for the emergence of moral capacity and reli-
gious capacity, based on recent findings in neuroscience, cognitive science, 
genomics, and population genetics in Rappaport and Corbally (2020, 73-
163). The model includes an evolutionary progression for the appearance of 
moral capacity and its biologically based antecedents, which emerged in the 
neurology of a series of species in the Order Primates. Our hypothesis is that 
moral decision making and ethics evolved first in Homo erectus, 1-1.5 mil-
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lion years ago, when the species learned to control fire, rather than later in 
Homo sapiens. We make this contention based on factors such as age struc-
ture, population density, prevailing African ecology, and the economy of 
Homo erectus (cf. Rappaport and Corbally 2016b). 
2.1. SEQUENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY INNOVATIONS LEADING TO MORAL 
CAPACITY AND ETHICS 
We use the term “moral capacity” to signify the biologically based, neuro-
logically enabled ability to make decisions of a certain type, in a certain way. 
We view “ethics” as creative cultural derivatives of that capacity, and so, 
rules shared within a specific group. The human moral decision-making ca-
pacity underlies its many overt expressions in all their variation through time 
and worldwide. Nevertheless, there are commonalities in the “phenotypic” 
expression of moral capacity (as opposed to its “genotypic” foundation in the 
genome). We see the phenotypic expression of moral decision making as a 
feature of groups, and if natural selection acts upon it, then it can be best un-
derstood to act at the group level. This assumption is consistent with the Ex-
tended Evolutionary Synthesis, which defines “multilevel selection” as a 
productive analytical approach in understanding specific evolutionary 
changes (cf. Rappaport and Corbally 2020, 34-39). 
Phenotypic expression of moral capacity in Homo erectus and later in 
Homo sapiens almost always includes some degree of each one of the fol-
lowing: A mental step both back and up; an arbitration mechanism that oper-
ates along a timeline; an evaluation using a valence from good to bad; a 
regretfully dispassionate reasoning; a tentativeness in a mental balancing act; 
a sad rejection of “wantonness”; a capacity (but not a requirement) for empa-
thy with someone receiving moral adjudication; the experience of a burden; 
resolution on the part of the group; hope and faith in the future on the part of 
the group. 
Note again that our model of the evolution of moral capacity shows it 
pre-dating religious capacity, which we find only in Homo sapiens and for 
very good reasons related to the expansion of specific brain organs that are 
involved in religious thinking, including: the precuneus (part of the parietal 
lobes), the prefrontal cortex, the cerebellum, and likely the maturation of the 
frontoparietal control network and connections with the cerebellum (Dixon 
et al. 2018; Smears et al. 2018; Tanabe et al. 2018; Rappaport and Corbally 
2020, 122-124). These expansions give rise to the globular skull shape so 
characteristic of Homo sapiens. 
We position the emergence of morality within a series of biologically 
based innovations along an evolutionary line leading to our modern species. 
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The moral capacity we propose for Homo erectus depended on all previous 
innovations. Full-blown religious capacity appears only in our species, Ho-
mo sapiens, and it depends on all the previous evolutionary innovations, in-
cluding moral capacity. The latter is largely subsumed by religious capacity 
in today’s modern world, so they are separable analytically, but rarely in 
practice. We summarize these 65 million years of innovations for the reader, 
here. Note that moral capacity emerges toward the end, and religious capaci-
ty, at the very end. 
 
Innovation: Sociality appears in the Order Primates, 65–55 million years 
ago. 
Innovation: Reorganization of the lateral cerebellum occurred in three 
mammalian orders, including the Order Primates. This provides a basis for 
cognition.  
Innovation: A basic ape model emerged in the mid-Miocene, from 19 mil-
lion years ago. 
Innovation: Realignment of the senses, and upgrades of vision and hearing 
occurred. 
 
Then, in some groups of our ancestral ape population giving rise to the 
genera Homo and Pan in Africa, the following happened: 
 
Innovation: There were changes in developmental trajectory, especially sec-
ondary altriciality and longevity. 
Innovation: A down-regulation of aggression occurred, along with greater 
social tolerance among adults, especially while feeding.  
Innovation: There were upgrades in intellect to manage aggression in social 
groups.  
Innovation: Greater sensitivity emerged, both general and emotional.  
Innovation: The biological foundations for culture emerged, evidenced 
weakly in the genus Pan and strongly in the genus Homo.  
Innovation: Aggressive scavenging of meat and a change in niche emerged 
with Homo habilis, 2.8 million years ago (Villmoare et al. 2015).  
Innovation: Moral capacity emerged in Homo erectus, 1.5–1 million years 
ago (Rappaport and Corbally 2016a; 2016b). 
Innovation: Religious capacity emerged in Homo sapiens, stabilizing at 
150,000–120,000 years ago (Rappaport and Corbally 2020). To date, reli-
gious capacity appears only in Homo sapiens, and it incorporates all the pre-
vious innovations listed above, including moral capacity (a type of decision 
making) and the resulting ability to create ethics or moral rules. 
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2.2. IMAGING THE EMERGENCE OF ETHICS IN HOMO ERECTUS 
It is important to be able to image the emergence of moral rules in bands of 
Homo erectus, according to paleobiological facts known about the species. 
Groups were large in comparison to previous hominoid troop sizes, ranging 
over one hundred individuals. Consider how complex the social interaction 
would be among one hundred individuals who lived a rugged, nomadic ex-
istence focused on scavenging meat and gathering other foodstuffs. Various 
age structures have been proposed. Some say the most elderly were forty-
five, but others say the age limit was around sixty years old (Carey 2003). 
Individuals gain substantial experience in sixty years. They have learned a 
great deal about how the physical and social world works.  
Something else happened: The relationships between different-aged indi-
viduals changed, with the lengthening of the age span and the advent of ado-
lescence and senility. The relationship between the sexes changed. Sexual 
dimorphism is strongly reduced in Homo erectus. Females, especially if they 
were pregnant or lactating, needed almost as much food as males (Coolidge 
and Wynn 2009, 116–118). The previous ape pattern showed much larger 
males in comparison to smaller females, for example, in the australopithe-
cines – from which the human line apparently did not descend (cf. Kimbel 
and Villmoare 2016). In Homo erectus, it has been proposed, according to 
the “Grandmother Hypothesis” (O’Connell, Hawkes, and Blurton Jones 
1999; Opie and Power 2011), that post-menopausal females helped to nour-
ish their own daughters’ children, enhancing the chances that their own 
genes would survive. 
Then, something happened that changed everything. Around 1.5 million 
years ago, social and cultural life on the evolutionary line to our modern 
species received an enormous boost that was partially responsible for the rise 
of moral rules, or ethics: Homo erectus learned to control fire. Charcoal 
hearths have been found farther and farther back into antiquity (Berna et al. 
2012). Why are they so important? Because they enabled an interactive con-
text around a common hearth for males and females of various ages who 
would know each other for long periods of time. The “rule” emerged from 
their interaction across what we have called “the bright white line” of moral-
ity. Philosophers have been more colorful, stating that humans stepped back 
from “wantonness” (cf. Frankfurt 1971; Korsgaard 2006). It is unusual to see 
the word “wantonness” in the writing of the social sciences because it feels 
judgmental. However, crossing that line evolutionarily and neurologically 
allowed just that: Moral discernment. It occurred through a decision-making 
process that evaluated facts along a timeline within a value context from 
“bad” to “good”, “unfair” to “just”, and “brutal” to “reasonable”. Lévi-
Strauss (1975) named the difference as that between “the raw” and “the 
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cooked”, which others have interpreted as the “culture-less” and the “cul-
ture-affected.” 
We contend that the Human Hearth encouraged storytelling, ritual, chant-
ing, and even percussion – but not music, which is enabled by a brain organ 
that was to expand far more in Homo sapiens than any of the species’ prede-
cessors – the precuneus (Bruner et al. 2018; Cavanna and Trimble 2006; 
Cavanna 2007). The precuneus is also fundamentally involved in concep-
tions of the self, comparison of the self to others, and even, we propose, 
comparison of the self with supernatural deities. Our thesis is that this com-
parison is the fundamental origin of ethics or moral rules in human groups. 
They had to originate in a type of species that was intensely social, self-
aware, smart, active, and demonstrative. Ethics make no sense for solitary 
creatures. They make no sense for creatures whose diets are assured, as 
among many vegetarian herd species. With the advent of the aggressive 
scavenging of meat in Homo habilis, the stage was set for the enlargement of 
the brain and the capacity to discern morally. The brain enlarged substantial-
ly in Homo erectus, which caused a further dependence of the group on 
hunting to obtain sufficient protein. Without the hunting of meat, the energy-
hungry brain could never have prevailed. That brain is the origin of ethics. 
It is difficult to imagine that one hundred Homo erectus individuals of 
both sexes and various ages could have gathered around a common camp 
fire and not discussed the successes and failures of the day’s search for food, 
the impetuosity of some young hunter, and the more measured pace of the 
older hunter, who dealt the final death blow or succeeded in chasing away a 
competing wildebeest. Homo erectus skulls averaged 1000-1100cc in com-
parison to the brains of Homo sapiens, which average 1300-1400cc. These 
are two different species, but the former was surely evolving into the latter. 
We contend that morality, an essential component of religious capacity that 
was to evolve in Homo sapiens, appeared first as a foundation in Homo erec-
tus. Our species then took moral capacity and incorporated it into every 
known religion. The two sit together in modern social and cultural life, sepa-
rable conceptually, but together in practice. This makes ethical thinking or-
ganically based, socially based, and culturally based, all at once. 
3. ETHICS OF HOMO SAPIENS IN THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TRADITION 
The two species we have discussed to this point are now understood to have 
overlapped in time. Homo erectus endured in isolation in Java until around 
110,000 years ago (Rizal et al. 2019). Homo sapiens evolved before that, be-
tween 400,000 and 300,000 years ago all over Africa (Hublin et al. 2017), 
and the species’ characteristic globular human skull shape stabilized 
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150,000-120,000 years ago (Bruner and Pearson 2013). Technically, the two 
species co-existed, but in very different parts of the globe. 
Homo sapiens, our species, went on to express moral capacity in a way 
that was bound up with religious capacity. We find fully expressed religious 
capacity only in our species, and not in related species such as Homo nean-
derthalensis, whose line split, after all, with our line around 800,000 years 
ago, in Africa (Gómez-Robles 2019). Did Neanderthals have some aspects 
of religious thinking? It is possible, but it is very likely that it was a very pre-
liminary type of religious thinking, in comparison to early humans with full 
religious thinking. Did Neanderthals bury their dead? Yes, in shallow graves. 
Did they leave burial offerings? Some say Yes, some say No. The facts are 
in dispute. 
Cognitive archaeologists are now describing the details of Neanderthal 
social life. They were very constricted socially, interacting in small nuclear 
families rather than joining other groups for hunting in the pattern of Homo 
sapiens (Wynn and Coolidge 2012; Pääbo 2014). Neanderthals do not leave 
evidence of the widespread trade routes that are so characteristic of early 
Homo sapiens in Eurasia. They hunted at close range, becoming injured, and 
lived short life spans. Neanderthal finds seem to show little or none of the 
reverence that early human graves reflect, to us, their modern descendants, 
when we try to interpret their meaning. If Neanderthals expressed religious 
capacity, then we two authors conclude it was weakly. 
Therefore, let us leap ahead to humans who did express religious capacity 
fully, in the variety of early religions of the Holy Land. We see their ability 
to use religious thinking clearly in the books of the Bible, as well as other 
books that were written but not included in the Bible, and in the Koran. All 
these literary sources can be useful while we transition from a prehistorical 
to an early historical understanding of “ethics.” The books of the Bible re-
veal the prevailing sentiments of the times, 2,000 and more years ago in the 
Levant. The peoples in that area were beginning to hold firm views about 
monotheism, i.e., about the existence of a “single god”, who eventually be-
came, from a Judeo-Christian perspective, “the one and only God.” 
We list here some of the attributes of God that are crafted into ethics, i.e., 
moral rules for how humans should behave. In each of the following exam-
ples, there is a transformation of a godly attribute to a rule. For the first at-
tribute, “goodness”, there is even a reference to rules or statutes. In 
“providence”, whose translation is now something like the broad protection 
by God or nature, we see some avenue toward an ecotheological ethic, tai-
lormade for the looming crisis confronting us all now on Earth. The ethics 
expressed in these verses of the Bible are broad, malleable for the times, in-
structive for children and adults alike, and very recent in a combined context 
of prehistory and history. They continue to serve those in the Judeo-
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Christian faiths well. 
 
Goodness  “You are good and do good; teach me your statutes” 
Psalms 119:68 
Graciousness  “But you, O Lord, are a God merciful and gracious” 
Psalms 85:15 
Holiness  “You shall therefore be holy, for I am holy” Leviticus 
11:45 
Love   “Anyone who does not love does not know God,  
because God is love.” 1 John 4:8 
Providence  “The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord  
establishes his steps.” Proverbs 16:9 
Righteousness  “Whoever practices righteousness is righteous, as He is 
righteous.” 1 John 3:7 
Veracity  “God shall send forth his mercy and his truth.” Psalms 
57:3 
Other ethics “But as for you, O man of God, flee these things. Pursue 
righteousness, godliness, faith, love, steadfastness,  
gentleness.” 1 Timothy 6:11 
 
In these godly attributes and corresponding ethics reflected in Biblical vers-
es, we see that human theological creativity has crafted attributes of the su-
pernatural into everyday rules for human behavior. The question remains: 
Where in the brain does this happen, and how does it happen? There are 
paths now toward an improved understanding of the neurological “engine” 
that produces moral rules and applies them routinely every day. 
4. CONCLUSIONS: LINKING A PREHISTORY OF IDEAS WITH THE HISTORY OF 
IDEAS  
The new sciences of genomics, neuroscience, cognitive science, and paleo-
neurology now give us a mechanism to trace the origins of ideas back from 
history into prehistory. We have mentioned some of the neurological founda-
tions that were evolving so that humans could engage in “religious thinking” 
and we explore these in depth in Rappaport and Corbally (2020).  
The precuneus gives a unique window onto the self, and the self in com-
parison with other humans and with supernatural beings. The foundations of 
a navigational sense in modern humans, which is seated in the parietal lobes, 
gives humans a compass and sense of direction to make our way through 
both natural and supernatural space (often expressed in religious ritual). The 
cerebellum gives us internal “models” for the way that things should be, and 
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the organ checks the quality of models used by the prefrontal lobes. Caution-
ary tales make more sense to believers. Myths come alive. The fronto-
parietal control network allows us to attend to the details of our environment 
while at the same time we reflect upon what we have done right and what we 
have done wrong. We can look inward and outward at the same time. The 
standard decision-making model maps the neural pathways that allow hu-
mans to make values-based decisions (Glimcher 2014). Values and the deci-
sion-making process itself are reflected in patterns of neuronal changes. 
If we can link up our understanding of global concepts like “ethics” or 
moral rules, and trace the genomics of their appearance, we will be able 
eventually to see more in our archaeological finds and begin to discover 
when the remarkable human abilities of moral discernment and moral deci-
sion making first appeared. Tracing concepts through time is what the histo-
ry of ideas is all about. We propose an analogous prehistory of ideas. With 
modern sciences, we can begin to link our historical understanding to a pre-
historical understanding. We are, after all, studying the same species after 
about 300,000 years ago – us. Before that, there were other members of our 
genus Homo. They were different from us, but not very much.  
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